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The Impact of Drug Trafficking on 
Informal Security Actors in Kenya 
Moritz Schuberth 
Abstract: The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: 
First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of 
security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-traf-
ficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly 
being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates 
the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision 
in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin 
America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that 
profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, 
while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politi-
cians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be 
less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article 
concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of 
the drug trade in Kenya. 
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In recent years, a number of Kenya’s top politicians and high-ranking 
public officials have been prosecuted or sanctioned by external actors 
based on two distinct, yet interconnected charges: The first is the widely 
discussed trial before the International Criminal Court against President 
Uhuru Kenyatta, his deputy, William Ruto, and other current or former 
government officials who are accused of crimes against humanity relating 
to the funding and arming of non-state armed groups such as Mungiki 
and their involvement in the 2007/2008 post-election violence (Waki 
Report 2008). The second sticking point, to which less international 
attention has been paid, is the designation of Kenyan MPs – including 
former assistant minister John Harun Mwau – as “drug kingpins” by the 
US government (Githongo and Wainaina 2011). Taken together, the two 
charges point to a dangerous combination of factors that have had seri-
ous consequences in comparably fragile settings in West Africa and Latin 
America: first, the emergence of Kenya as a transit hub and destination 
country for narcotic drugs and, second, the existence of a plethora of 
non-state armed groups acting as informal security actors in areas where 
state security provision is absent or insufficient.  
Research from Central America, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil has 
shown how non-state armed groups which had initially been formed for 
protection purposes have been corrupted by drug lords and have come 
to present serious challenges to human security. Moreover, recent 
developments in West Africa suggest that increased drug trafficking 
throughout the region has led to the criminalization or capture of state 
institutions by sophisticated drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) with 
financial capacities that outshine those of entire countries. The most 
prominent example in this regard is Guinea-Bissau, which has been 
called “Africa’s first narco-state” (O’Regan 2012).  
In the context of Kenya, numerous studies have revealed how poli-
ticians use non-state armed groups to commit violence against political 
rivals, particularly in the context of the 2007/2008 post-election violence 
(Klopp and Kamungi 2007/2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; de Smedt 
2009; Okombo and Sana 2010; Jacobs 2011; Ndung’u and Wepundi 
2012). Moreover, informal security providers such as Sungusungu vigi-
lantes (Heald 2007) or the Mungiki militia (Kagwanja 2003; Servant 2007; 
Ruteere 2008) have been studied in depth. Concerning the impact of drug 
trafficking on Kenya, research has been limited to the health implications 
of drug consumption on the local level (Deveau et al. 2006) and the conse-
quences of narco-corruption for formal state agencies (Gastrow 2011b). 
No literature is available on the impact of the international drug trade on 
informal security providers in Kenya. This is all the more surprising given 
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the sheer prevalence of informal security actors and considering that the 
country is becoming ever more affected by DTOs.  
Drawing upon both secondary sources and my own field research in 
Kenya, this article attempts to close this gap in the literature on Kenya 
and to put the findings into the broader context of comparable experi-
ences in other regions. Concepts of state fragility and alternatively gov-
erned spaces are used as common points of reference in order to bridge 
both the analytical gap between drug trafficking and informal security 
provision and the regional gap between Latin America and Africa.1  
Informalization of Security  
One important dimension of state fragility is the decay of administrative, 
political, judicial and security institutions (Ezrow and Frantz 2013), 
which results in the loss of what Weber (1946: 78) famously termed the 
“monopoly on the legitimate means of violence”. The weakness of the 
Kenyan state and its incapacity to provide security have been traced back 
to both external and internal factors. Externally, structural adjustment 
programmes – imposed on Kenya by international financial institutions 
in the late 1980s – forced the government to implement the neoliberal 
agenda of economic liberalization and privatization (Katumanga 2005; 
Wamucii and Idwasi 2011). This, it is argued, led to rapidly increasing 
unemployment in urban areas, the expansion of informal settlements and 
the loss of the state’s ability to provide security (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2005). Internally, former long-term president Daniel arap Moi 
deliberately weakened state institutions in order to both thwart attempts 
to erode his power and cover up the looting of state resources by his 
regime (Southall 1999; Mueller 2008). In this respect, Katumanga (2005) 
refers to a “twin strategy” of privatizing public violence and appropriat-
ing private violence. The privatization of public violence during the 
1990s involved deploying off-duty security forces and vigilante groups 
against regime enemies (Roessler 2005). Simultaneously, economic 
conditions led to the emergence of militias which were soon co-opted 
for political motives (Servant 2007; Branch and Cheeseman 2008). In the 
long term, however, transferring the capacity to commit organized vio-
lence to informal actors backfired, and the political leadership lost con-
trol over the use of violence (Branch and Cheeseman 2008).  
1  The author would like to thank Julia Buxton, Paul Omach, Andreas Mehler and 
the two anonymous reviewers of Africa Spectrum for useful comments on earlier 
drafts of this article. 
 58 Moritz Schuberth 
Closely correlated to institutional decay and the informalization of 
security is another dimension of state fragility: the erosion of state 
legitimacy caused by violations of the rule of law by formal security 
providers (Stepputat et al. 2007). In Kenya, a mix of corruption, lack of 
resources and fear deters state security agencies from adequately exer-
cising their duty within slums, which tarnishes their reputation among 
the urban poor. To begin with, corruption and impunity are rampant 
among all ranks of the Kenyan police force. For instance, a main distrib-
uter of cannabis in Nairobi discloses that police are well aware of the 
depot where his product is stored, but do not intervene as they are on 
the payroll of traffickers.2 Moreover, although the US has officially desig-
nated four Kenyan MPs and an influential businessman as “drug king-
pins”,3 Kenyan police did not properly investigate their involvement in 
organized crime (Githongo and Wainaina 2011; Mwivano 2011). 
Furthermore, a civil society representative explained to me that “police 
normally don’t go into slums, they normally just patrol on the roads. 
Because at some point, they could be overwhelmed by the people. It has 
happened that the police have been beaten up and [had] guns taken away 
from them.”4 This leads to lethargy and demoralization among police-
men, who have been accused of extrajudicial killings of urban youth, 
reportedly with the authorization of the government (Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights 2007). This is why police are perceived as 
a source of insecurity and a tool of political repression among the urban 
poor, whereby vigilantism is seen by many as an acceptable form of 
community policing (Anderson 2002; Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003; 
Scheye and Andersen 2007). As a result, more and more inhabitants of 
poor urban areas depend on non-state armed groups such as vigilantes, 
militias and gangs for a certain degree of security (Mutahi 2011; Ogada 
and Mue 2010).5  
2  Drug wholesaler; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
3  Under the so-called “Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act”. 
4  Representative of a civil society organization; personal interview, Mombasa, 
July 2012. 
5  In this article, the term “informal security provider” is used in reference to any 
such non-state armed group carrying out security-related tasks, including those 
initiated or supported by the state. In addition to vigilantes, militias and gangs, 
this includes state-led paramilitaries; formal non-state armed groups such as 
private security companies are excluded.  
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The Impact of Drug Trafficking 
Institutional decay and violations of the rule of law through formal secu-
rity providers in fragile states are cause and effect not only of the emer-
gence of informal security actors, but also of the advent of drug-traf-
ficking organizations. Weak states lack the financial and institutional 
capacity to control their borders or to tackle transnational criminal activ-
ities within their boundaries, especially in areas with limited state pres-
ence (Buxton 2006; Mandel 2011). What is more, DTOs turn to states 
characterized by a weak rule of law in expectation of opportunities to 
penetrate state institutions and the political system (Jordan 1999; Thoumi 
2007; Carrier and Klantschnig 2012).  
Nonetheless, it has been argued that collapsed or failed states with a 
high degree of political instability present a more challenging environ-
ment for drug traffickers than weak states with stable leaders who are 
susceptible to corruption (Csete and Sánchez 2013). Transnational drug 
trafficking necessitates a certain degree of sophistication in terms of 
infrastructure and financial services, which is more likely to be found in 
“weak but functioning states” such as Kenya than in more fragile con-
texts (Patrick 2011). In this respect, Koonings and Kruijt (2004) suggest 
that the terms “hidden” or “partial” state failure are more appropriate in 
the context of Latin America, where the provision of public security has 
collapsed only in some areas.6 Moreover, concepts of failed and fragile 
states have been criticized as misleading and culturally biased towards the 
ideal type of liberal Western democracies. According to this emerging 
school of thought, it would be more appropriate to speak of “areas of 
limited statehood”, which “lack the capacity to implement and enforce 
central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force” (Risse 2011: 2). It 
has been made clear, however, that far from being “ungoverned spaces”, 
such “black spots” or “brown areas” are under the control of “alterna-
tive authority and governance structures” (O’Donnell 1993; Stanislawski 
2008; Clunan 2010). This became apparent during my fieldwork in the 
slums of Nairobi and Mombasa,7 where I found that numerous informal 
6  Arias (2010: 119) confirms that Latin America is characterized by “medium-
strength” states rather than by “the classic ‘weak’ state found in Africa”. 
7  I conducted 29 semi-structured interviews with law enforcement officers, youth 
leaders, community leaders, religious leaders, social workers, civil society or-
ganizations, vigilantes, gang leaders, recovering drug addicts and drug traffick-
ers in Nairobi, Mombasa and Malindi between June and August 2012. In order 
to increase the validity of the research, I triangulated the data by carrying out 
overt observation within informal settlements in Nairobi and Mombasa during 
the same period of time. However, it has to be kept in mind that my presence 
 60 Moritz Schuberth 
security providers are in competition to fill the gap left by an absent 
state. At the same time, it is precisely in such “no-go zones for govern-
ment and law-enforcement agencies” (Cockayne and Williams 2009: 10) 
where drug-trafficking organizations have taken over public security 
functions in some countries in Latin America (Inkster and Comolli 
2012). In order to better understand the potential impact of drug 
trafficking on informal security actors in Kenya, it appears invaluable to 
provide an overview of the Latin American experience with this concern. 
Experience from Latin America 
The most detailed micro-level analysis in this respect is Dennis Rodgers’ 
account of how the relationship of a Nicaraguan street gang vis-à-vis 
their community transformed from protective to predatory as a result of 
the arrival of cocaine at the turn of the millennium. When first conduct-
ing research in a barrio of Nicaragua’s capital, Managua, in the 1990s, 
Rodgers (2007b) observed that local gangs were largely viewed positively 
in their community because they protected inhabitants from other gangs. 
However, due to tightened anti-drugs efforts in the Caribbean and the 
improvement of infrastructure in Nicaragua, more and more Colombian 
cocaine was shipped through the country on its way to North America 
(Rodgers 2007a). As gangs in Managua consequently became enmeshed 
in the local drug economy, the security situation in the barrio deterio-
rated significantly (Rodgers 2007b). Instead of protecting their own com-
munity, gang members started to provide their “security services” to 
drug lords and “imposed a predatory regime of terror that served [their] 
new drugs-related economic interests” (Rodgers 2006: 290).  
A comparable development on an even larger scale has been re-
ported from other Central American countries with a considerable pres-
ence of maras – politicized, internationalized and sophisticated “third-
generation” gangs (Sullivan 2006).8 The maras were formed in Los Ange-
les by immigrants who had fled from the civil wars in Central America in 
order to protect their communities against other well-established gangs 
(Dudley 2010; Valdez 2011). Mass deportations of gang members from 
the US to their Central American countries of origin (Zilberg 2011) and 
                                                                                                    
might have influenced the object of observation, particularly since the period of 
fieldwork was too short for me to become effectively immersed. 
8  Rodgers and Muggah (2009: 305) distinguish between the “more localized, 
homegrown” pandillas, which are still the most common type of gangs in Nica-
ragua, and the maras, which have “transnational roots” and are the predominant 
type of gang in the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras). 
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massive incarceration of alleged gang members as part of harsh mano dura 
(“firm hand”) anti-gang policies in the region contributed to the expan-
sion and institutionalization of the maras (Hume 2007; Jütersonke et al. 
2009). Since the drug trade from Colombia to North America is increas-
ingly passing through Central America, they have undergone “a change 
in motivation, shifting towards a more sustained use of instrumental vio-
lence for economic purposes” (Cruz 2010: 393). While their activities 
were initially based on “solidarity, respect and mutual support” (Cruz 
2010: 393), maras have recently been found to work as local “subcontrac-
tors” for Los Zetas and other Mexican DTOs (Inkster and Comolli 
2012: 97).  
Among Latin American countries, Mexico is currently the most se-
verely affected by drug-related violence and insecurity. Since the “pax 
mafiosa” between organized crime and the Mexican state ended at the 
beginning of the new millennium, the country has experienced an out-
burst of inter-cartel and cartel–state violence, particularly after former 
president Felipe Calderón launched a military offensive against DTOs in 
2006 (International Crisis Group 2013). One of the DTOs, called La 
Familia Michoacana, had been formed in the 1980s as a local group of 
vigilantes “with the stated purpose of bringing order to Michoacán, em-
phasizing help and protection for the poor” (Logan and Sullivan 2009). 
Ironically, the group transformed from a self-declared crusader against 
drug abuse into the leading manufacturer of crystal meth in Mexico, the 
Mexican attorney general subsequently calling it “the most dangerous 
cartel in the country” (Finnegan 2010). In 2011, the cartel known as the 
Caballeros Templarios emerged as the successor to the now disbanded 
La Familia, using the same rhetoric of social justice and community 
protection while specializing in methamphetamine production and 
heroin trafficking (Guerrero-Gutiérrez 2011; Beittel 2013). In response 
to atrocities committed by the Caballeros, farmers and former soldiers 
formed self-defence groups to take back cities and regions under the 
control of DTOs (Grayson 2014; Archibold and Villegas 2014). After 
shoot-outs between soldiers and vigilantes led to civilian deaths, the 
government decided to legalize the self-defence groups and to incorpo-
rate them into existing Rural Defence Force units (Cawley 2014). How-
ever, the inclusion of former gang and cartel members (Tuckman 2014) 
and accusations that the vigilantes were linked to the Jalisco Nueva Gen-
eración cartel raised concerns that the “self-declared protectors may end 
up becoming predators themselves” (Archibold and Villegas 2014). 
Consequently, a number of commentators compared the state-sanc-
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tioned self-defence groups in Michoacán to right-wing paramilitary 
forces in Colombia (Cawley 2014; Kinosian 2014). 
The Colombian paramilitaries have been traced back to “small priv-
ate vigilante groups” formed by rural landholders in order to protect 
their assets from left-wing guerrillas fighting for land redistribution 
(Rozema 2007). Indeed, the Colombian state authorized the creation of 
heavily armed civilian groups in the 1960s (Mazzei 2009). While some 
scholars have argued that the weakness of public institutions urged the 
Colombian elite to resort to non-state armed groups to counter the in-
surgency (Pizarro Leongómez 2004), others have pointed out that it 
proved to be a highly convenient strategy for the government to delegate 
the “dirty work” to paramilitaries (Giraldo 1996; Hristov 2009). In any 
case, the government soon lost control over the militias as they became 
enmeshed in the growing drug trade (Inkster and Comolli 2012). Para-
military groups such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) 
controlled more than half of Colombia’s trade in narcotic drugs and were 
responsible for the death of more civilians than the guerrilla army they 
had been created to fight (Mazzei 2009). On the local level, the para-
militaries took control over youth gangs and vigilante groups which had 
been formed for self-protection purposes in Medellín’s poor neighbour-
hoods (Salazar 1990; Rozema 2007). All in all, through their involvement 
in the drug trade, Colombian paramilitary forces transformed from de-
fensive vigilantes into offensive and ungovernable armed actors with 
political ambitions including the goal of “destabiliz[ing] the state itself” 
(Pécaut 1999: 153). 
A comparable case can be found in Brazil, where a prison-based 
self-protection group transformed into one of the main DTOs in Rio de 
Janeiro. During Brazil’s military dictatorship, political prisoners and 
common criminals who were put in the same maximum security prisons 
banded together to form a group called “o coletivo”, which established 
itself as a vigilante group within Rio’s prison system (Dowdney 2003; 
Penglase 2008). Later, o coletivo came to be known as the Comando 
Vermelho and started to become a major player in the burgeoning drug 
trade (Gay 2009). This happened in the first half of the 1980s, when 
Brazil was undergoing a period of democratization and as tougher anti-
drug measures in Colombia turned Rio de Janeiro into South America’s 
foremost transit point for Andean cocaine on the way to Europe and 
North America (Perlman 2009). Eventually, the Comando Vermelho 
split into rival factions, whose tough competition over the control of the 
drug market led to what Gay (2005: 55) calls “a period of intense and 
bloody civil war for control of the favelas”. At the same time, drug gangs 
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imposed themselves as informal security providers in the favelas (Leeds 
1996; Goldstein 2003; Alves and Evanson 2011). Over the last decade, 
however, a growing number of Rio’s favelas have been taken over by 
militias made up of off-duty and retired prison guards, police officers 
and firemen (Perlman 2009). The heavily armed militias typically invade 
favelas, force out drug gangs and “demand” protection fees from the 
residents (Misse 2007). However, their rule turned out to be so harsh and 
all-dominant that it has been described as a “reign of terror” even worse 
than that formerly imposed by the expelled drug traffickers (Cano 2008; 
Ribeiro and Oliveira 2010). What is more, a number of militias are coop-
erating with drug gangs and have established themselves as another viol-
ent actor fighting for both territorial control and a market share of the 
lucrative drug trade (Perlman 2009; Gay 2009). 
Drug Trafficking in Africa 
Because of decreasing consumption rates in the US and stepped up inter-
diction efforts in Mexico and the Caribbean, South American DTOs 
have recently refocused their attention on Europe (Cockayne and 
Williams 2009). The European drug market is highly profitable thanks to 
rising consumption rates and the higher value of the euro compared to 
the US dollar (Cockayne and Williams 2009; UNODC 2013b). At the 
same time, European law enforcement activities along northern trans-
atlantic cocaine routes are pushing South American DTOs to seek 
southern routes to Europe via West Africa as an alternative (Wyler and 
Cook 2009). There, well-established Nigerian and Ghanaian drug net-
works with a strong presence in other West African countries and 
longstanding links to other parts of the world serve as “local partners” 
for Latin American traffickers (Ellis 2009: 192). West Africa is parti-
cularly vulnerable to penetration by drug traffickers due to poverty, 
widespread corruption, weak state-security agencies and poor border-
control capacities (Cornell 2007). This has raised concerns that the regi-
on might follow Latin America’s experience of skyrocketing drug-related 
violence committed by powerful non-state armed groups (O’Regan 2010; 
Alemika 2013). Yet, in contrast to the rich literature on informal security 
providers in Latin America outlined above, most research on drug traff-
icking in West Africa has focused on its impact on fragile and corruptible 
formal security actors.9 Building on the work of Bayart et al. (1999), 
9  There are exceptions – for instance, concerns raised about “the possibility that 
trafficking through the region could provide income to non-state armed groups, 
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endemic public corruption and the penetration of state institutions by 
drug traffickers have been described as evidence of a “criminalization of 
the state” (Ellis 2009; Bybee 2012). Most attention in this respect has 
been given to Guinea-Bissau, whose countless islands off of its coastline, 
institutional decay and rampant corruption “create fertile conditions for 
the flourishing of the cocaine trade” (Madeira et al. 2011: 1). Yet, the 
UNODC (2013b) reports that cocaine seizures have actually been drop-
ping since an all-time high was reached in 2007. In this respect, it has 
been argued that the country is in fact too politically unstable for drug 
traffickers (Patrick 2011). 
In contrast to Guinea-Bissau, Kenya belongs to the category of 
“weak but functioning states”, the environments in which DTOs prefer 
to carry out their operations (Patrick 2011). This might explain why 
Kenya is reportedly playing an ever more important role as both destina-
tion and transit country for cocaine trafficked by West African drug 
networks (UNODC 2013c). Indeed, a unique combination of favourable 
factors make Kenya particularly attractive for drug traffickers: staggering 
levels of corruption within the political and criminal justice systems; 
insufficient law enforcement capacities; efficient financial services; a solid 
communications infrastructure; and relatively reliable transportation 
facilities (Gastrow 2011a). Because of these characteristics, Kenya has 
been a point of entry for Afghan heroin destined for Europe and South 
Africa for more than three decades (UNODC 2013c). Sharply increased 
heroin seizures off of the coast of Mombasa since 2010, however, sug-
gest that domestic consumption and the importance of the region as 
transit hub have both increased (UNODC 2013a).  
One potential explanation for this development would be disrup-
tions along the so-called “Balkan route”, which has traditionally linked 
Afghanistan to Europe via Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. This possibility has 
raised concerns that East Africa might become “the new ‘Balkan route’” 
for heroin, which could have a regional impact “similar to [that] of co-
caine in West Africa” (UNODC 2013a: 22). Since the vast majority of 
drugs transported to and from East Africa come by sea, the areas most 
affected by the drug trade are located along the Swahili coast, most nota-
bly around the major ports of Mombasa in Kenya and Dar es Salaam in 
Tanzania. To a lesser degree, drugs are also trafficked by air via the in-
ternational airports in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which serve 
as regional transportation hubs (UNODC 2013a). In contrast, notori-
                                                                                                    
especially the various rebel forces in the Sahel and the terrorist group Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)” (UNODC 2013b: 4). See also Alemika (2013). 
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ously unstable Somalia is less affected by international drug traffickers, 
apart from trade in light drugs across the border with Kenya (Menkhaus 
2004; Shay 2008).  
As far as Kenya is concerned, a number of studies have highlighted 
the consequences of rising drug consumption for public health (Deveau et 
al. 2006; Mwivano 2011). Still, little has been written on the impact of drug 
trafficking on security providers. A notable exception is Gastrow’s assess-
ment of the implications of organized criminal activities for the function-
ing of state institutions in Kenya. According to the author, in order to 
minimize the risks for their business operations, DTOs recruit Kenyan 
politicians, high-ranking government officials and businessmen as “agents 
of influence or access” who “provide political protection and information” 
(Gastrow 2011a: 24). Apart from that, however, no research has been 
conducted on the impact of drug trafficking on informal security providers 
in Kenya. Based on fieldwork in the slums of Nairobi and Mombasa, the 
following sections attempt to close this gap in the literature.  
Informal Security Actors and Drug Trafficking 
in Kenya 
One of the numerous vigilante groups operating in the Kibera slum in 
Nairobi is called the Kamukunji Pressure Group.10 It is comprised of 
approximately 800 members, each of whom pays a small weekly mem-
bership fee. Like other groups in the area, Kamukunji organizes audiences 
for political rallies and provides security for politicians during electoral 
events (Mutahi 2011). As its present leader explained to me, the group 
started as a political forum fighting for multiparty democracy in the early 
1990s. At a certain point, however, the group transformed and began to 
undertake security-related activities.11 According to Dennis (2012), 
Kamukunji can be hired by politicians to disturb and intimidate their op-
ponents. The chairman of the group admits that politicians do take ad-
vantage of financially vulnerable members of the group by hiring them “to 
do certain things in return for cash”.12 Some members of the group are in 
prison because of drug-related crimes, including drug trafficking.  
In general, however, informal security actors in Kibera are only 
marginally involved in the drug trade: They can be hired to secure trans-
10  Kamukunji means “forum” in Swahili.  
11  Leader of a vigilante group; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
12  Leader of a vigilante group; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
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portation of cannabis and chang’aa13 or to provide security at dens where 
the illicit goods are consumed.14 Still, as cases of collaboration with deal-
ers are isolated and limited to light drugs, informal security actors in 
Kibera do not seem to be instrumentalized by DTOs. This can partly be 
explained by different consumption patterns between informal settle-
ments and more affluent neighbourhoods. In Kibera, the drug market is 
hugely dominated by Cannabis sativa and illicitly brewed alcohol, which 
are regarded by many as “drugs of the poor”.15 As these substances are 
very cheap, they are widespread within deprived communities and traf-
ficked and sold by a small network of individuals.16 The trade with hard 
drugs such as cocaine and heroin, on the other hand, yields far more 
profit and is usually controlled by sophisticated transnational trafficking 
networks (Gastrow 2011b). As hard drugs are more expensive, they can 
almost exclusively be found in Nairobi’s middle-class neighbourhoods.17  
The situation is different within informal settlements around Mom-
basa, which are littered with heroin and, to a lesser degree, cocaine. Ap-
parently, drugs have spilled over from wealthy neighbourhoods into 
slum areas. Unlike in Nairobi, which is a less important transit hub for 
drugs than the coast, heroin has been rampant on the streets of Mom-
basa for over 25 years (Deveau et al. 2006). Although hard drugs were 
initially consumed by wealthy coastal inhabitants and tourists, they grad-
ually infested less affluent sections of the coastal population (Gastrow 
2011b). When drug users and dealers were chased from the centre of 
Mombasa by police and faith-based vigilantes, they moved to surround-
ing low-income areas such as Likoni and Kisauni.18 Accordingly, many 
addicts from more affluent parts of town go to slum areas in order to 
purchase drugs.19 Simultaneously, hard drugs have spilled over from 
13  Strong, illicitly brewed alcohol. Chang’aa literally means “kill me quickly” in 
Swahili.  
14  Programme officer with Open Society Foundation; personal interview, Nairobi, 
July 2012. 
15  Community leader; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
16  Transnationally operating drug trafficker; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
17  Youth leader; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. It has been estimated that 
heroin users in Kenya spend between 4.80 and 10.80 USD every day on their 
addiction (UNODC 2013a).  
18  Recovering heroin addict; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. In the context 
of Latin America, such a “displacement of criminal networks from one city/ 
state/region to another […] in search of safer havens and more pliable state 
authorities” has been coined “the cockroach effect” (Bagley 2012: 11). 
19  Director of a rehabilitation centre; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. Rep-
resentative of a civil society organization; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
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Mombasa into other coastal towns such as Malindi and Lamu (Deveau et 
al. 2006).  
The expansion of the drug trade on the coast has led to an escala-
tion of violence between rival DTOs. A senior police officer reveals that 
a recent increase of homicides in Mombasa has been caused by fights 
between rival DTOs, between DTOs and police, and even between 
different factions of the police.20 One such incident reportedly occurred 
in Mombasa’s Kisauni slum. Referring to the testimony of the officer in 
charge of the anti-narcotics unit, a trainer for drug control reports how 
the attempted arrest of a drug lord led to heavy fighting between police 
and members of a vigilante group. According to the source, vigilantes on 
the payroll of a drug lord attacked the anti-narcotics police with crude 
weapons and firearms in order to save their boss from being detained, as 
he was their primary source of income. After a shoot-out that caused 
serious injuries on both sides, the police finally managed to arrest the 
drug lord.21 This incident illustrates how deeply involved vigilante groups 
are in drug trafficking and to what extent they are ready to protect their 
patrons. 
The case of a vigilante group in the Soweto area of the Likoni slum 
in Mombasa reveals the strong connection between drug traffickers, 
political actors and informal security providers. A former vigilante leader 
reported to me that he led a group of 15 local youths who took over the 
provision of security within their area in cooperation with police and 
local administration.22 However, in the end a number of the group’s 
members were working in various ways for the local drug lord, who took 
advantage of the pre-existing organizational structure of the group: Vigi-
lantes abused the relationship they had with the police and warned drug 
lords about planned raids. They also acted as personal bodyguards for 
dealers and provided security around the drug dens.23 In addition, they 
were used to find new clients in other parts of town and escort them to 
the drug dens in Likoni. Finally, feeling highly protected in their position 
as security providers, vigilantes started to sell drugs themselves.24  
In addition to paying vigilantes, drug traffickers in Likoni also have 
police officers on their payroll. Moreover, they act as an important 
source of funding for politicians, and some of them are even running for 
20  Senior police investigator; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
21  Anti-drugs activist; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
22  Former leader of a vigilante group; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
23  Anti-drugs activist; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
24  Former leader of a vigilante group; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
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office themselves.25 In order to consolidate their power, drug lords have 
hosted social events in conjunction with politicians and provide financial 
assistance in times of need. This has led to a complicated “love–hate 
relationship” between drug gangs and the affected communities (Mutahi 
2011: 15). Altogether, certain neglected areas of Mombasa seem to be de 
facto ruled and controlled by drug lords.26 A senior police investigator 
confirms that parts of the coast are under the control of sophisticated 
drug gangs which are armed with AK-47s and use helicopters to 
transport their illegal goods.27  
As the above cases suggest, financial vulnerability and lack of ac-
countability make non-state armed groups particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation by external actors (Baker 2007).28 A youth leader from 
Nairobi29 and a community worker from Mombasa30 agree that most 
people join informal security providers for material reasons and can be 
hired for any activity.31 Reminiscent of “violent entrepreneurs” in coun-
tries like Italy (Gambetta 1996), Russia (Volkov 2002) and Colombia 
(Bedoya 2010), many informal security actors “subcontract” their violent 
services to the highest bidder (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 198). In 
Nairobi, the centre of political power, informal security providers have 
been found to be hired primarily for political purposes. Politicians use 
these groups to provide security during rallies in slum areas, to work as a 
mobilizing platform, or to act as goon squads to intimidate or eliminate 
political opponents. In Mombasa, the epicentre of the regional drug 
trade, drug lords have been found to hire vigilantes as scouts, body-
guards or peddlers. In an environment of extreme poverty and high rates 
of unemployment, individual informal security providers themselves are 
in many cases actively – sometimes aggressively – competing for “em-
ployment” by external actors. As a youth leader and peace activist in 
Kibera explains:  
Here in slums if I want to stand for an elective post, people will 
know about it. So whenever they see you, they come around to 
25  Anti-drugs activist; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
26  Former leader of a vigilante group; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
27  Senior police investigator; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
28  In this case, “external” means outside of the community, not necessarily out-
side of the state as it would normally be defined in the context of international 
relations. 
29  Youth leader; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
30  Community worker; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
31  This is confirmed by a recent survey on youth formations in Kenya (Dennis 
2012). 
 Drug Trafficking and Informal Security Actors in Kenya 69 
praise you and follow you. Even the youths themselves, they want 
you to give them something. If you make a deal with them and 
buy them some drugs and alcohol, they will definitely do whatever 
you want them to do for you.32  
Likewise, a former vigilante leader in one of Mombasa’s slums points out 
that poverty and lack of opportunities have led to an outright competi-
tion among vigilantes to work for drug lords. If there are not enough 
positions to accommodate all members of a vigilante group, “there is [an 
internal] fight over the commission from the drug barons”.33 If the 
source of funding runs out – for instance, when the election period is 
over or a drug lord is imprisoned – the group might turn into a predatory 
gang which provides for itself through illegal activities such as extortion 
and robbery (Njonjo 2011).  
Contrary to the abovementioned cases, it has been found that a 
number of faith-based security providers are more resistant to being 
instrumentalized by drug lords – for instance’s Kibera’s Al Safa, which 
apparently has not been co-opted by external actors and did not turn 
predatory. Starting as an environmental group made up of Nubians, Al 
Safa’s initial task was to collect rubbish off the streets in exchange for a 
small fee. When crime and insecurity escalated in 2005, the group ex-
tended its operations to security provision in the form of nighttime street 
patrols.34 However, Al Safa was banned later that year along with other 
vigilante groups and – unlike many others – actually ceased their secu-
rity-related activities. Subsequently, the group refocused their attention 
on environmental protection. It can be argued that it was the ownership 
of the community over the group and its strong religious and cultural 
foundations that prevented its members from transforming into crimi-
nals for hire. Nubians form the oldest community within Kibera, and 
their community ties remain strong (Jacobs 2011). As one analyst put it, 
“the Nubian Council of Elders literally knows all the youths who are 
[part of Al Safa]”;35 by contrast, other parts of Kibera have been “in-
vaded” by vigilante groups from outside. At the same time, the strong 
standing of their Islamic belief against drugs and other vices might also 
discourage the vigilantes from engaging in such criminal activities. Simi-
32  Youth leader; personal interview, Nairobi, July 2012. 
33  Former leader of a vigilante group; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
34  Programme officer with Open Society Foundation; personal interview, Nairobi, 
July 2012. 
35  Programme officer with Open Society Foundation; personal interview, Nairobi, 
July 2012. 
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lar behaviour among faith-based vigilantes has been observed in Mom-
basa, as the following cases reveal. 
Out of 200 drug traffickers and dealers brought to trial in Mombasa 
in 2010, more than half were arrested by an anti-narcotics vigilante group 
established by the Council of Imams (Kitimo and Muyanga 2011). This 
vigilante group operates in the Old Town section of Mombasa, a rela-
tively prosperous and predominantly Muslim community. Having real-
ized that they cannot capture powerful drug lords, the group systemati-
cally targets drug addicts. In this context, the director of a rehabilitation 
centre recounted to me that a number of addicts who had received 
treatment in his facilities were lynched after having been caught commit-
ting petty crimes such as mobile phone theft. Carrying out public lynch-
ings, the vigilantes announced, “This is how [we] will be dealing with 
drug users that are stealing.”36 Even though they are breaking the law by 
way of the extralegal killings, the group seems to have remained incor-
ruptible within their own narrow context, and so far they have avoided 
transforming into a more predatory protection racket. This might be 
attributed to the strong leadership, relative wealth and financial inde-
pendence of its members, ownership of the community over the group, 
and the unifying Muslim faith which strongly condemns drug abuse. A 
recovering heroin addict and community worker explains the roles un-
employment and religion play when comparing vigilantes in Old Town 
to those in slums on the periphery: 
Sometimes the communities on the outskirts form their own vigi-
lantes. But they turned and started to take bribes and steal from 
other people, because they were unemployed. This happened in 
the outskirts. But in town, majority are Muslim. So the vigilantes 
in town are based on faith and therefore it is difficult to bribe 
them. The problem is they use excessive force. They can beat 
someone to death, just for selling or for using.37 
The member of a Muslim vigilante group in the coastal town of Malindi 
justifies the use of excessive force when expressing his frustration over 
police involvement or inactivity in relation to drug trafficking: “When we 
take [the drug dealers] to police they are free after few days. So you have to 
do something better. To kill them.”38 He further explains that his group 
lynches their victims publicly to set a precedent: “When we kill them, we 
[put] a tyre around them, add gasoline and burn them. So the other ones 
36  Director of a rehabilitation centre; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
37  Recovering heroin addict; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
38  Member of a Muslim vigilante group; personal interview, Malindi, July 2012. 
 Drug Trafficking and Informal Security Actors in Kenya 71 
who see it will not sell drugs anymore. We make it public.”39 Comparably 
radical punishment of drug users and sellers has been reported from re-
gions in Somalia under the control of al-Shabaab, where shari’a law has 
been implemented (Shay 2008).40 Al-Shabaab is exerting considerable 
influence on Muslim youth on the Kenyan coast – for instance, through a 
local militant group in Mombasa called al-Hijra (Botha 2013).  
The strong stance of the Muslim community against drugs might 
also be explained by anecdotal evidence that most drug users at the coast 
can be found among the indigenous population, which is predominantly 
made up of Muslims.41 The chairman of the Supreme Council of Kenyan 
Muslims in Mombasa underlines how seriously he takes drugs: “Drugs 
have been at the centre of everything. All kinds of theft, all kinds of 
insecurity, and all security threats are caused by drugs.”42 However, faith-
based vigilantes can also be externally manipulated. One member of a 
Muslim vigilante group in Mombasa’s Bondeni area – considerably less 
wealthy than Old Town – discloses that although he is personally against 
collaborating with drug traffickers, he has to obey his boss’ orders. Ac-
cordingly, whenever the vigilante leader strikes a deal with drug lords, the 
group is told not to interfere with the business of a certain person or not 
to patrol in a particular area during a given period of time. Nevertheless, 
despite admitting to smoking cannabis himself, the vigilante assured me 
that a member would immediately be punished and kicked out of the 
group if it was found he was selling drugs: “For Islam, we do not deal 
with drugs. We follow the rules of Islam.”43  
Conclusion 
Based on secondary data and fieldwork in Kenya, this article has illus-
trated how and to what degree informal security providers in Kenya are 
under the thumb of transnational drug traffickers. In Nairobi, which is 
39  This particular way of killing – popularly referred to as “necklacing” – was a 
common practice to punish alleged government supporters and criminals in 
South Africa during Apartheid rule. Recent news reports suggest that the prac-
tice is being reintroduced by vigilante groups in Cape Town’s townships. 
40  Unlike other jihadist terrorist groups in Africa such as AQIM, al-Shabaab is not 
considered to be linked to drug trafficking (Thornberry and Levy 2011; 
Williams and Felbab-Brown 2012). 
41  Representative of a civil society organization; personal interview, Mombasa, July 
2012. Former leader of a vigilante group; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
42  Chairman of the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims in Mombasa; personal 
interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
43  Member of a Muslim vigilante group; personal interview, Mombasa, July 2012. 
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less affected by the drug trade than the coast, informal security actors are 
only marginally involved in drug-related activities and do not have links 
to more sophisticated DTOs. Instead, non-state armed groups are hired 
mainly by political actors for their own protection during rallies in slums, 
but also to intimidate and attack political opponents. In Mombasa, by 
contrast, drug lords involved in the international and highly profitable 
heroin trade have both formal and informal security providers on their 
payroll. This discrepancy can be explained by different consumption 
patterns in the slums of the capital as compared to those in Coast Prov-
ince. In Nairobi, hard drugs are limited to wealthier neighbourhoods, 
whereas cheap, illicitly brewed alcohol and cannabis are widespread 
within the slums. By way of contrast, drug traffickers and their custom-
ers in Mombasa have been chased away from the city centre and pushed 
into slum areas, which now serve as dens for drug users from all socio-
economic backgrounds. At the same time, a number of faith-based in-
formal security actors in both cities have been found to be less suscep-
tible to manipulation by drug lords.  
As the Latin American case studies have shown, the control of in-
formal security actors by powerful DTOs can have considerable conse-
quences for affected communities. In Mexico and Colombia, large parts 
of the country have been under the control of armed actors who are 
deeply involved in drug trafficking. In Central America and Brazil, homi-
cide rates in major cities have skyrocketed as a result of armed confron-
tations between drug gangs, militias and state security forces, all of which 
are involved in drug trafficking. By way of comparison, the corruption of 
informal security providers by drug lords in Kenya has not reached such 
alarming proportions. However, if global trafficking patterns were to 
change, the security situation in Kenya might deteriorate. Should East 
Africa really become the new “Balkan route” for the heroin trade from 
Afghanistan to Europe, drug lords in Mombasa would become even 
more powerful and turf wars between subcontracted informal security 
actors might escalate. Moreover, cocaine trafficking has already deeply 
compromised security actors in West African countries such as Guinea-
Bissau. Should concerns that Kenya is becoming another main transit 
hub for cocaine from South America to Europe prove true, hard drugs 
may very well proliferate in Nairobi and spill over into the city’s informal 
settlements. Once drug lords have taken control over these areas, they 
will most likely hire local informal security actors for protection. This, in 
turn, might lead to armed confrontations between rival gangs or between 
gangs and police even worse than those observed in Mombasa. In 2006, 
a gang dispute over an illicit brew market in Nairobi’s Mathare slum 
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caused several deaths and displaced more than 9,000 people (Daniels 
2009). This incident provides a glimpse into the consequences that Nai-
robi’s most vulnerable communities might suffer if vigilantes, gangs and 
militias fight on behalf of drug lords over the control of the far more 
lucrative market in hard drugs.  
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Drogenhandel und informelle Sicherheitskräfte in Kenia 
Zusammenfassung: Der kenianische Staat gerät derzeit von zwei Seiten 
unter Druck: Erstens haben zahlreiche nichtstaatliche bewaffnete Gruppen 
in Gebieten, in denen der Staat praktisch nicht präsent ist, den Sicher-
heitssektor übernommen; zweitens gewinnt der Drogenhandel immer 
mehr an Boden, weil das Land zunehmend als bedeutender Drogenum-
schlagplatz genutzt wird. Der Beitrag untersucht die Beziehungen zwi-
schen Drogenhandel und informellen Sicherheitsstrukturen in Kenia und 
zieht einen Vergleich zu ähnlichen Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika und 
Westafrika. Aufgrund seiner Feldforschungen in Kenia kommt der Autor 
zu dem Schluss, dass profitorientierte informelle Sicherheitsakteure in 
Mombasa für Drogenhändler arbeiten, während entsprechende Gruppen 
in Nairobi eher von Politikern angeheuert werden. Zudem scheinen glau-
bensbasierte Gruppen in beiden Städten weniger empfänglich für Mani-
pulationsversuche von Drogenhändlern zu sein. Abschließend skizziert der 
Autor die potenziellen Konsequenzen einer Ausweitung des Drogenhan-
dels in Kenia. 
Schlagwörter: Kenia, Westafrika, Lateinamerika, Drogenhandel, Orga-
nisierte Kriminalität, Paramilitärische Verbände 
